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Abstract This paper investigates the notion of “distributed cognition”—the idea 
that entities external to one’s organic brain participate in one’s overall cognitive 
functioning—and the challenges it poses to the notion of personhood. Related to 
this is also a consideration of the ever-increasing ways in which neuroprostheses 
replace and functionally replicate organic parts of the brain. However, the litera-
ture surrounding such issues has tended to take an almost exclusively physicalist 
approach. The common assumption is that, given that non-physicalist theories 
(chiefly, dualism, and hylomorphism) postulate some form of immaterial “soul,” 
then they are immune from the challenges that these advances in cognitive science 
pose. The first aim of this paper, therefore, is to argue that this is not the case.
 The second aim of this paper is to attempt to elucidate a route available for 
non-physicalists that will allow them to accept the notion of distributed cognition. 
By appealing to an Aristotelian framework, I propose that non-physicalists can 
accept the notion of distributed cognition by appealing to the notion of “unitary 
life” which I  introduce, as well as to Aristotle’s dichotomy between active and 
passive mind.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the notion of “distributed cognition”—the idea 
that entities external to one’s organic brain participate in one’s overall 
cognitive functioning—and the new questions it poses. Related to this is 
also a consideration of the ever-increasing ways in which neuroprostheses 
replace and functionally replicate organic parts of the brain. However, the 
literature surrounding such issues has tended to take an almost exclusively 
physicalist approach. My first argument in this paper is that distributed 
cognition and neuroprostheses present new questions even for dualist and 
hylomorphic theories of mind, which might be problematic if not addressed. 
Chiefly, it shall be seen that, in instances of distributed cognition, or in 
the use of (certain types of) neuroprostheses, inorganic parts (which are 
sometimes even spatially distant from the physical body) seem to form 
part of the subject’s mind and, consequently, we could also say part of the 
subject’s person. To admit as much would be to open a pandora’s box of 
ethical dilemmas if a framework for delineating which entities form part 
of one’s person is not forthcoming. The common assumption is that, given 
that dualist and hylomorphic theories postulate some form of immaterial 
“soul,” they are immune from the novel issues that these advances in cogni-
tive science present. The first aim of this paper, therefore, is to argue that 
this is not the case.
The dualist and hylomorphist may choose to dismiss the notion of dis-
tributed cognition as false (as some physicalists have done). 1 However, the 
second aim of this paper is to attempt to elucidate a second route avail-
able for the non-physicalist that will allow them to accept the notion of 
distributed cognition. To this end, I shall first show how, within dualist 
and hylomorphic theories—unless strictly specified and explicated—we 
frequently find a co-extension of the terms “soul” and “mind”: they are 
broadly understood to mean and refer to the same entity. 2 By appealing to 
an Aristotelian framework, I propose that, in separating these two notions, 
the non-physicalist has a way in which she can accept the notion of dis-
tributed cognition.
2. Distributed Cognition and Neuroprostheses
Broadly speaking, what distributed cognition and neuroprostheses have 
in common is the replacement, in some way or form, of an organic part 
by a functionally identical inorganic one. I shall briefly elaborate on some 
1. A good example of this within physicalist literature is Adams and Aizawa (2008).
2. I shall use the term “soul-mind” when referring to this co-extended concept.
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salient features that are relevant to our present discussion and the pressures 
they put on a variety of theories of mind, not only physicalist.
What does distributed cognition assert and why should it cause a prob-
lem? As a first pass, the breakthrough of distributed cognition is that the 
mind, or, at the very least, cognition, is not only located within the brain, 
but rather extends outwards. 3 How this extension occurs and what other 
entities are involved in cognition apart from the brain is still hotly debated. 
The point that is crucial to our current debate is the fact that underpinning 
this philosophical thesis are various empirical observations in cognitive 
science that seem to indicate that inanimate, external objects share in the 
cognitive process and thus—proponents of distributed cognition would 
say—are constitutive of our cognitive apparatus.
The standard canon of literature on distributed cognition typically begins 
with Clark and Chalmers’ (CC) “The Extended Mind” (1998). CC moti-
vate their thesis by the now-famous thought experiment involving Otto 
and Inga. Both Otto and Inga want to get to the Museum of Modern Art 
(MOMA). Inga has a belief that MOMA is on 53rd Street. She walks there and, 
sure enough, she successfully arrives at the museum. In doing so, Inga has 
relied on her internal, biological memory. Otto, on the other hand, suffers 
from Alzheimer’s and thus cannot store information internally as well as 
Inga can. To this end, he carries with him a notebook in which he records 
information he might need at a future time. Upon deciding to make his 
way to MOMA, he immediately consults his notebook, finds the address 
written there, and successfully arrives on 53rd Street. In this way, therefore, 
the information contained in Otto’s notebook provides the content for his 
dispositional belief as to where MOMA is, while Inga stores that content 
internally. CC thus make the following argument: if both Otto and Inga 
successfully arrive at MOMA, then Otto’s notebook is fulfilling the same 
functional role as Inga’s biological memory and, hence, should be consid-
ered as participating in the cognitive process. Distributed cognition can 
thus be understood in the following way:
In these cases, the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-
way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive 
system in its own right. All the components in the system play an active 
causal role, and they jointly govern behaviour in the same sort of way that 
3. In fact, the term “extended mind” is also frequently used instead of “distributed cognition” 
to mean roughly the same thing. In our present context, “distributed cognition” is preferred 
due to its wider applicability. 
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cognition usually does. If we remove the external component the system’s 
behavioural competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of 
its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts equally well 
as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head. (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998, 8–9) 
The motivation behind arguments within cognitive science which advance 
the notion of distributed cognition is empirical evidence to suggest that 
we use the environment around us—mobile phones, tablets, and even less 
technologically advanced artifacts such as notebooks or diaries—to enable 
us to “offload” parts of the cognitive process in order to help us carry out 
a specific task successfully. Another typical example would be the fact that 
I would use pen and paper to perform a complicated mathematical equation 
that I would otherwise be unable to perform mentally without such aids. 4
Furthermore, since what one holds as regards to mind affects what one 
holds with regards to personhood, one of the implications of distributed 
cognition is what CC term as the “extended self” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, 
18) (henceforth extended). If the person is to be located where the mind 
is, and if the mind is extended, then the person is also extended. One can 
immediately realise that this possibility gives rise to a host of practical, legal 
and ethical issues. It has already been stated that the philosophical thesis 
of distributed cognition forms part of the wider physicalist debate. How-
ever, I argue that the notion of distributed cognition causes problems not 
only for the physicalist but also for the dualist and the hylomorphist. One 
avenue for overcoming these problems is to reject the notion of distributed 
cognition altogether. However, I propose that this need not necessarily be 
the case, and the non-physicalist can reconcile the notion of extended by 
separating the notions of soul and mind. I shall approach this particular 
issue in the following sections.
We can now proceed to the second part of this section—the issue of 
inorganic entities within the brain itself. Neuroprostheses are not cases of 
distributed cognition per se, but rather of the same cognition that used to 
be carried out by an organic part of the brain that is replaced by an inor-
ganic part—similar to replacing an organic heart with an artificial one. In 
these situations, therefore, the brain state or event that used to be realised 
4. Wilson and Clark (2009) provide a fuller explanation of this, along with how it can be 
seen in an evolutionary perspective. See Wilson and Lenart (2015) for a wide variety of refer-
ences that support this thesis.
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by a specific set of neurones is now realised by an inorganic replacement 
that is functionally equivalent.
Some types of neuroprostheses are already widely used, such as cochlear 
implants, while we can imagine that medical advancements may give us 
the possibility of replacing more and more parts of the brain with inorganic 
alternatives. Buller (2013), in fact, argues in favour of a position wherein 
these neuroprostheses should be considered as part of the person. We can 
take this even further and imagine a situation in which every part of the 
brain is slowly replaced by an inorganic counterpart such that we arrive 
at the point where there are no organic parts left (we can even extend this 
argument for the rest of the body—the philosophical consequences are the 
same). Whereas distributed cognition gives rise to extended as we have 
seen above, we can call this present case illustrated here an instance of an 
“inorganic self” (henceforth inorganic). What extended and inorganic 
both show us is that our intuition that cognitive processes are limited only 
to neural organic matter is false. In this manner, it no longer makes sense 
to speak of the brain (qua bodily organ) but rather the “cognitive system” 
which incorporates with it all those material elements—organic or not—that 
constitute the cognitive process. In the following section I shall explore 
how the dualist, physicalist, and hylomorphist react to these notions of 
extended or inorganic.
3. Physicalism, Dualism, and Hylomorphism
Broadly speaking, the three general positions one can hold with respect 
to soul-mind and body are physicalism (or materialism), dualism, or some 
intermediate hylomorphic position. In this section, I shall consider Lynne 
Rudder Baker’s “constitution view” as well as Olson’s “animalist” view as 
physicalist positions, Richard Swinburne’s reinterpretation of strict Carte-
sian dualism, and Józef Bremer’s application of Aristotle’s concept of soul 
and human persons as a hylomorphic view.
3.1. Physicalism
Baker views the person as being constituted by the body, having what she 
terms “a capacity for … a first-person perspective” (2000, 4). In fact, her 
view is referred to as the “Constitution View.” She further articulates what 
is meant by constitution and the importance of the first-person perspective:
A person is not a separate thing from the constituting body, any more than 
a statue is a separate thing from the constituting block of marble. Nor is 
a person identical to the constituting body. The nonidentity of person and 
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body, on the Constitution View, is guaranteed by the fact that any body could 
exist without a first-person perspective, but no person could exist without 
a capacity for first-person perspective. (Baker 2000, 91)
This view thus seeks to understand mind and personhood as arising or 
emerging from the animal. This first-person perspective can be likened to 
the “self,” although she does not make explicit recourse to the term. Baker 
defines the first-person perspective as a mental property of a higher level 
(as opposed to those related to homeostasis and other non-intentional 
bodily functions and movements). This means that it arises out of the 
physical development of the animal itself. Baker thus dismisses the notion 
of an immaterial soul-mind and explains the first-person perspective in 
physicalist terms.
While some physicalists have no qualms about accepting the extended or 
inorganic self (Clark 2008), Baker holds that extended is an absurd notion 
to hold. However, despite being a physicalist, Baker articulates cognition 
and mind as being separable by introducing a separation between personal 
and sub-personal states. Briefly put, Baker articulates whatever happens 
on a personal level as those mental states of which I am consciously aware, 
and what ultimately always pertains to the mind. On the other hand, what-
ever happens on a sub-personal level, I am not consciously aware of—this 
is the level of cognition. On this latter level, it is possible for instances 
of cognition to be extended to include extended, non-organic entities as 
participants. Recall that, for Baker, a person is characterised as an organ-
ism gaining the (capacity for) first-person perspective. This awareness of 
“I” thoughts is, by definition, conscious in nature. Therefore, all conscious 
mental states must be carried out by a person—an agent or “cognizer.” That 
which occurs on the sub-personal level can be extended because it does 
not require an agent per se and we are to infer that, mutatis mutandis, the 
same principles of distributed cognition still hold on this sub-personal level 
(i.e. multiple-realisability and functionalism). Baker summarises her thesis 
in the following manner:
a person can have subpersonal parts that are not organic, and these can be 
material vehicles (or components of vehicles) of a person’s mental states. 
In this way, the person can have extended cognition, because the material 
vehicles of her contentful mental states may be inorganic. But the person is 
constituted by a body, perhaps partly bionic, and the person spatially coin-
cides with the body that constitutes her and does not extend beyond it. (Baker 
2009, 655) 
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Baker’s aim, therefore, is to show that, while instances of cognition may 
occasionally extend out of one’s physical body, this does not mean that the 
person (or her mind, for that matter) also extends outwards. Why is this 
so? Baker is here attempting to fit distributed cognition into her theory of 
personhood, a theory which—as we have already seen—asserts that a person 
always coincides with her body. This is because a person—inasmuch as it 
is a new ontological entity—arises out from the organism and is bounded 
by it. Baker is unwilling to accept the notion of extended as this would 
entail counting whatever external object is being coupled as part of the 
person (as CC state); however, as Baker aptly puts it, “shifting and transi-
tory hybrids can hardly be persons” (Baker 2009, 656) since a person must 
always coincide with her body.
However, it seems like we are begging the question here. While Baker has 
sought to accommodate a modified version of distributed cognition in terms 
of “extended-cognition-but-not-extended-mind,” is such a view coherent? 
Specifically, is the separation between cognition and mind tenable This 
separation shall be appealed to later on yet in a different manner. Baker 
herself admits that her main focus has been metaphysical rather than one 
related to cognitive science. However, Baker’s attempt to “reconcile” dis-
tributed cognition with her constitution view seems like trying to hammer 
a square peg into a round hole. Baker has taken her view as primary and 
adapted a theory of mind to fit her view, with some unsavoury results. For 
example, some argue that the separation between personal and sub-personal 
states is itself unsupported by contemporary cognitive science (Rupert 
2018). Therefore, while Baker’s view has many positive features that we 
would want in reconciling distributed cognition with personhood—such as 
a preservation of the “bounded” person which does not extend outwards—it 
lacks the necessary supporting framework to make it credible.
However, it should be noted that, while Baker is unsympathetic to the 
notion of extended, she is less so towards the notion of inorganic. She 
asserts that: 
It is an empirical fact that organs in a human body can be modified (and made to 
function properly) by artificial parts—cochlear implants, mind-brain interfaces, 
artificial hearts and other organs (soon an artificial eye), prosthetic limbs, neural 
implants and on and on. Even now, paralyzed people who have mind-brain 
interfaces are not simply constituted by a human organism, but by a human 
organism and a nonorganic prosthetic device. At some point, there could be 
enough nonorganic devices that support your mental and behavioral function-
ing that we should say that your body is no longer organic. (Baker 2011, 50)
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Thus, we can observe that, on Baker’s physicalist framework, mind arises 
out of an organic body but can also incorporate inorganic parts, as long as 
such parts form part of a single physical entity—a single body that is not 
extended outwards to include other, distinct and separate objects.
This view is to be contrasted with another physicalist position advanced 
by Olson. Olson claims that “we human people are animals” (Olson 2003, 
365). This view is considered as the archetype position of animalism, 
which roughly falls within the category of physicalist theories, yet with 
some notable differences from Baker’s view above. It would help to state 
what Olson is not saying. He is not equating personhood with one’s 
body—in fact, he tries to do away with the term “body” as much as pos-
sible, seeing it as the source of “much philosophical confusion” (Olson 
2003, 365). Therefore, whereas a body still exists even after death as 
a corpse, the same cannot be said of an animal—Olson argues that there 
is no such thing as a “dead animal.” In this respect, the notion of life can 
be inferred to be an important principle in the persistence conditions of 
personhood on this theory; a human person persists if the animal with 
which it is identified does not cease in carrying out certain functions 
such as metabolism and exhibit teleology, amongst other things (Olson 
1997, chap. 6). 
However, upon closer inspection, animalism tells us little more than what 
has been stated above. It does not state that every person must necessarily 
be an animal—since Olson leaves open the possibility of non-human (and, 
curiously, non-material) persons, such as gods and angels. The only claim 
animalism makes is that if there exists a human person, then that person 
must necessarily be a human animal. As a result, some have questioned 
the usefulness of such a theory. Olson admits as much:
This leads some to object that it isn’t a view of personal identity at all … 
There is some truth in this complaint. [Animalism] doesn’t purport to give 
the persistence conditions of all and only people, or of people as such. It even 
implies that we are only temporarily and contingently people (on the usual 
definitions of that term). (2003, 365) 
Yet, even given the limited assertions that animalism does make, Olson 
holds that it is still a superior view to maintain. The fact that we are animals 
should be irrefutable, and this fact alone is enough to render psychological 
views (like Baker’s) incompatible as candidates for articulating personhood 
since they privilege one part of the organism (the brain) over the animal 
as a whole, single entity.
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A major objection that Olson presents in favour of his argument is what 
he terms the “thinking-brain” problem—a variation of the “thinking-animal” 
problem. Olson articulates the problem as follows;
Thinking-Brain Problem:
(1) There is such a thing as my brain.
(2) My brain thinks my thoughts in the strictest sense.
(3) If my brain thinks my thoughts in the strictest sense, then anything 
else that thinks my thoughts does so only in the derivative sense 
of having a part that thinks in the strictest sense.
(4) If anything thinks my thoughts in the strictest sense, I do.
   [(C)] … I am my brain. (Olson 2007, 79) 
Olson considers this a problem precisely because, if I am my brain, then 
I cannot be my “organism.” This is to say, it would be impossible truthfully 
to say, “I have brown eyes,” or, “I am five feet tall,” because having brown 
eyes or being five feet tall are not properties that brains can possibly have. 
This problem is even further exacerbated when Olson challenges extended. 
extended alters premise (2) above to state that even Otto’s notebook is 
participating in Otto’s thoughts, and not only his brain. As a result, this 
gives us CC’s conclusion; Otto’s self is extended to include his notebook. 
Olson is understandably unhappy with this conclusion because “although 
the notebook comes to be a part of Otto (on the extended self), it never 
becomes part of any organism. It follows that Otto is not an organism” 
(Olson 2011, 486).
We can therefore see that Olson’s “brand” of physicalism is unique. 
While traditional physicalist theories of cognition (like Baker’s) undershoot 
Olson’s mark of identifying the person with the organism by locating per-
sonhood only in part of the organism (the brain), extended overshoots 
Olson’s theory by setting a boundary that exceeds the physical boundary of 
the organism. The result of both situations is that the person cannot be an 
organism. This leads us into another problem that Olson has with psycho-
logical theories of personhood generally: the too many thinkers problem. 
Briefly stated, Olson asserts that, while psychological beings are said to be 
thinking, we should also expect normally functioning human organisms 
to be capable of thought as well; therefore we are in the strange position 
of asserting two beings—a biological and a psychological one 5—which are 
thinking the same thoughts with no way of determining which one of them 
is me. It should be noted that, in presenting this problem, Olson is making 
a number of assumptions and one can argue that in posing the question as 
5. Since we have seen that a psychological entity necessarily cannot be an organism.
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to whether one is a person or an organism (2011, 487), he is actually begging 
the question. However, let us put our misgivings about this problem to one 
side and—due to our inability presently to put a finger on what exactly is 
not right about too many thinkers—accept it as a given.
Olson further states that the reasoning that underpins the identifica-
tion of mental states with the self is what he terms as thinking-subject 
minimalism. This states that, “a psychological being is located at a place 
if and only if at least one of its mental states is located or realized there” 
(Olson 2011, 492). 
This minimalism is articulated in terms of “direct involvement” (Olson 
2007, 88), meaning that for something to form part of the psychological 
person it must be directly involved in the process of thinking. At the same 
time, however, this principle causes problems. Despite including external 
objects (on extended), when considering the brain, one could make the 
argument that only parts of the brain are directly involved (such as parts 
of the neurones, or the synapses, but surely not the blood vessels inside the 
brain), thus shrinking the person to only those relevant parts. Olson sees 
this principle as unattractive and, furthermore, considers the distinction 
between direct and indirect involvement to be an arbitrary one. From what 
has already been stated about Olson, we can also come to the conclusion 
that animalism is incompatible with inorganic precisely because animal-
ism maintains the importance of the organic organism for delineating 
personhood.
Thus, while conscious of the variety of physicalist theories not discussed 
in this paper, of the two physicalist positions I have considered, Baker’s 
tries to side-step the ethical challenges that extended would present to 
us by postulating a distinction between cognition and mind (albeit being 
more sympathetic to inorganic). Olson, on the other hand, manages to 
shut the door to extended and inorganic altogether by privileging the 
notion of life (which I shall turn to again further on). However, this comes 
at the cost of disregarding the special function that the brain has in cogni-
tion compared with the rest of the organism. 
3.2. Dualism
Swinburne, on the other hand, presents a typical dualist position following 
in the Cartesian tradition. In “Are we Bodies or Souls?” Swinburne’s posi-
tion categorically chooses the latter. We can also see here the conflation of 
soul-mind that I have alluded to at the opening of this paper in a specific 
and clear manner. In the introduction of his recent publication, he merely 
gives this passing comment:
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Substance dualism is a view available both to religious believers and to athe-
ists. If anyone feels that the very word “soul” already implies a religious 
outlook, substitute the word “self” for the word “soul” throughout this book. 
The word “mind” is sometimes used in the sense in which I am using the word 
“soul” as an individual thing, separate from the body; but “mind” is often used 
in other senses, sometimes very unclear ones. (Swinburne 2019, 2) 
The soul-mind, therefore, is the immaterial entity that experiences mental 
states and undergoes mental events—which are differentiated from the 
brain which has brain states and brain events. The relationship between the 
two is aptly summed up by Swinburne, who states that “not merely does 
the brain cause events in the soul, but the soul causes events in both soul 
and brain” (2019, 115). Swinburne thus disregards the common objection 
against dualism—the issue of causal closure between the physical and the 
mental—and asserts that mental and brain events can be the cause of one 
another. The soul-mind, however, remains the essential part of a person (as 
opposed to the body which is non-essential) since we continue exist even 
when not linked to a body (Swinburne 2019, 108).
Furthermore, following his Cartesian stance, Swinburne asserts that 
we are well justified in believing that souls cause brain events, as well as 
that brains cause events in souls … each human soul interacts with a brain 
(2019, 139).
Again, the notions elucidated above come into play. Taking note of the 
phenomena of distributed cognition and neuroprostheses articulated in 
the previous section, a more precise way for Swinburne to state the above 
would be to say that each human soul-mind interacts with a cognitive 
system. This is so since, on Swinburne’s account, the relevant feature of 
the brain is that it is physical—the fact that it also happens to be organic is 
not given importance, leading one to believe that it could as well be partly 
or completely inorganic and distributed. There is a further step that needs 
to be said. Swinburne then goes on to articulate the location of the soul-
mind. He states that:
[a soul] can be said to be located at the place if there is a place at which and 
only at which it exercises its causal influence, and by events at which it is itself 
causally influenced. In this sense a soul is located at that region of the brain 
with which it interacts and so is extended, although necessarily indivisible. 
If the soul ceases to be capable of interacting with its brain, and there is no 
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other physical substance with which it is capable of interacting, then—even 
if it continues to have a mental life—there seems to be no sense in which it 
would have a location. (Swinburne 2019, 39–140)
Therefore, we can easily imagine an inorganic part of the cognitive 
system with which the soul-mind is interacting—as the emphasized phrase 
seems to allow space for—as long as “causal influence” is being exerted on or 
by that particular part. Thus, we could theoretically be in a position to say 
that the soul of a particular individual is either located wholly in some inor-
ganic substance or possibly even extended outward of the brain. It seems, 
then, that Swinburne’s dualist articulation can accept both extended and 
inorganic, and, prima facie, it seems there is no reason not to. 
3.3. Hylomorphism
Finally, Józef Bremer (2017) argues in favour of an Aristotelian articula-
tion of “soul” and seeks to integrate it within contemporary neuroscience. 
Bremer’s point is to show, by means of a Sellarsian approach, that “the 
Aristotelian conception of soul is preferable to that of Cartesian mind” 
(2017, 66; emphasis added). 6 This Aristotelian approach is classified as 
a hylomorphist view. A midway position between physicalism and dual-
ism, hylomorphism does not view the primary entity which makes up the 
human person as being only material as in physicalism, nor does it view 
the human person as being primarily an immaterial substance that can 
exist with or without a material body. On the contrary, this view requires 
the “marriage” of both elements of soul and body, based on the Aristotelian 
dichotomy of form and matter. 7 Bremer aptly summarises this by stating 
that “the reality of souls is properly captured by the concepts of form and 
formal causation” (2017, 48).
A common (albeit rather crude) way of understanding the Aristotelian 
soul is to liken it with “life.” Aristotle in On the Soul (hereafter De Anima) 
held that “what has soul in it differs from what has not in that the former 
displays life” (De Anima II.2 413a22). In this sense, all living things have 
a soul, yet Aristotle then distinguishes between the three main capacities 
of the soul—nutrition, perception, and mind (or intellect). While all living 
things exhibit nutrition, only animals exhibit nutrition and perception, and 
6. Again, however, “soul” and “mind” here should be taken to mean what I am calling for 
the time being “soul-mind.”
7. This is not without its problems. There is some controversy within the study of Aristotle 
as to the application of hylomorphism to the case of human beings. However, this is beyond 
our current scope. For more, see Appendix A of (Shields 2016).
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only humans exhibit all three faculties. More can be said on this particu-
larly complex notion of soul, yet this would go beyond our present needs. 
There is also still some debate among commentators of Aristotle as to what 
he really meant about numerous things. Furthermore, there is also some 
confusion as to whether the soul (or part of it) can exist separately from 
the body, and whether it is a special sort of substance unlike other forms. 
Some of these issues will be briefly touched upon further down.
So what stresses, if any, do extended and inorganic place on the Aris-
totelian conception of soul? We have already seen in the preceding section 
how, in the cases of extended or inorganic, the replacement or “adding 
on” of inorganic parts serves to sustain the mental functioning of the indi-
vidual. Both are seen to function exactly like a fully organic individual. 
A fortiori, were the inorganic, or separate parts to be removed from the 
former two individuals, they would cease to function normally. Aristotle 
could have never conceived of the world we inhabit today, so naturally 
his philosophical framework does not cater to the current scientific and 
technological milestones we are undergoing. Yet, he does get close in his 
Metaphysics, when he states that:
even if all circles that had ever been seen were of bronze (for none the less the 
bronze would be no part of the form); but it is hard to effect this severance in 
thought. E.g. the form of man is always found in flesh and bones and parts 
of this kind; are these also then parts of the form and the formula? No, they 
are matter; but because man is not found also in other matters we are unable 
to effect this severance. (Metaph. Z 1.1.1036b1-6)
What, then, should restrict us from considering only organic matter in 
Aristotle’s dichotomy of matter and form? Nothing, I believe. To hold 
a contrary position would be to exert a form of foundationless organic-
chauvinism. Some commentators in fact argue in favour of a  form of 
“variable-realizability”:
Contemporary writers often claim that the “hardware” (neurons rather 
than silicon chips) is or ought to be irrelevant to contemporary psycho-
logy; it is claimed to be a fact that systems other than animal organisms 
can perform many of the functions that we can perform too. So the precise 
nature of the physical “hardware” is irrelevant to interesting generalizations 
about psychological competence: these latter transcend the precise nature 
of their actual “matter.” (Wilkes 1995, 124) 
Yet, this is not to say that the hylomorphic framework could be distilled 
down and reduced to functionalism itself (Cohen 1995). While the notions 
136 Jean Gové 
of extended and inorganic have arisen out of the functionalist framework, 
to assent to them does not necessarily imply an assent to functionalism as 
a whole. Nevertheless, it seems that, from the above, the hylomorphist is 
constrained to accept inorganic unless further arguments to the contrary 
are presented. This much is already admitted by another hylomorphist—
David Hershenov (2008). Hershenov asserts that in the case of inorganic 
(including also inorganic part replacement of the rest of the body and not 
just the cerebrum), we can say that:
The soul has either come to configure just the remaining organic part of the 
brain or has actually come to configure the inorganic parts as well. What 
might make one say the latter is the case is if the person can control some of 
the inorganic parts. That is, the thoughts of the person cause the inorganic 
parts to move just as it did earlier with its arms and legs. But since the inor-
ganic parts don’t grow and decay, nor are reciprocally dependent upon each 
other as are the vital organ systems of an organism, readers might prefer the 
first interpretation of what is configured by the soul of the person. (Hershe-
nov 2008, 497) 
Things are not as clear when it comes to extended, however. This shall 
be tackled and clarified in the following section.
Before proceeding, however, a comment should also be said about per-
sonhood, due to its relevance further on. Whether one is a dualist, hylo-
morphist, or physicalist influences the manner in which one articulates 
personhood. Broadly speaking, dualists take the soul-mind to be that entity 
that determines personhood, materialists take the mind to be embodied 
and realised in one (or more) physical entity and therefore identify those 
entities that realise the mind as being the person, while hylomorphists take 
the combination of both soul-mind and body to constitute the full person. 
It can be easily seen from the three subsections above that physical-
ism, dualism and hylomorphism must articulate some kind of relation-
ship between the soul-mind and a physical entity (with the exception of 
animalism, in some sense), be it the body or the brain specifically. Due to 
this very fact, all three types of theories are placed under pressure by the 
realities of distributed cognition and neuroprostheses. In this manner, the 
first aim of this paper has been achieved. 
Therefore, the serious implications that the physicalist faces are now 
shared by the non-physicalist as well. Since hylomorphists and dualists 
consider the soul-mind (or “soul-plus-body” in the case of hylomorphism) to 
be deserving of ethical value, they seem constrained to follow through with 
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the implications of their position and—given the arguments put forward 
above—accord legal and moral weight to those physical objects wherein 
one’s soul-mind—and, consequently, one’s person—resides and with which 
it interacts. 8 For both theories, this would also lead to having to consider 
the inorganic parts, as well as possibly the extended parts that participate 
in the overall cognitive system of an individual, as deserving of the same 
ethical value accorded the rest of the body in virtue of being in relation to 
the soul-mind. The hylomorphist should do so because, on her view, these 
inorganic parts are—functionally speaking—part of the body. The dualist, 
on the other hand, should do so because the soul-mind seems also to reside 
in these inorganic parts given that, again, these parts are part of the brain 
(and, by extension, the body).
In this sense, therefore, the notions of extended and inorganic, while 
relating in a slightly different manner with physicalism, hylomorphism, 
and dualism, can be seen to arrive at the same consequences; there is no 
coherent manner in which, on the definition of “body” given by each, these 
inorganic parts can fail to be considered as part of the overall cognitive 
system (and, hence, the body).
4. A Fourth Way—Aristotle Revisited
We have seen in the preceding section that the notions of extended and 
inorganic lead to unsavoury consequences on each of the three frame-
works being considered. Where does this leave us? Proponents of either 
theory may choose to bite the bullet and accept that the inorganic parts also 
form part of one’s person and should be accorded the same ethical value 
given that the soul-mind is present in these parts as well or, alternatively, 
dismiss the notion of extended and inorganic outrightly.
I propose yet another alternative, one that can still respect the empiri-
cal evidence in favour of inorganic and extended parts forming part of the 
overall cognitive system, while still restricting ethical value to the organic, 
living body only. This, I argue, can be done by separating the notions of 
“soul” and “mind.” How can this be done? The concept of “soul” has a much 
longer history, spanning back to Plato and Aristotle, whereas we cannot 
say the same for the concept of “mind” as an entity per se—which can trace 
8. Carter and Palermos (2016) delve specifically into the legal argument (albeit from a purely 
physicalist perspective) and, despite making a case in favour of extended having legal impli-
cations, still fall short of advocating in favour of the extended person. We can analogously 
apply similar reasoning to our present discussion. 
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its roots back to Descartes. 9 The crucial point to notice here is that, while 
“mind” has always had the function of “mentality,” pertaining to thinking 
and reasoning and acting, the notion of soul on the other hand—especially 
prior to Descartes—held within it not only the function of mentality but 
also identity, vitality, as well as a theological transcendental function (at 
least within the Christian philosophical tradition). In this regard, I agree 
with Bremer that: 
the Cartesian conception of soul came to supplant the Aristotelian one in 
a manner that can be described as pars pro toto: the thinking soul was itself 
identified with the entirety of Aristotelian soul. As a consequence, the phi-
losophy and psychology of consciousness, and the neurosciences, have all 
come in essence to amount to sciences deprived of soul in the Aristotelian 
sense. (2017, 67) 
One’s soul—conceived in Aristotelian terms—must remain the basis for 
ascribing ethical value to the organic individual (and bounding it in the 
process). Aristotle speaks of the human body as having such a soul because 
it carries out and exhibits the three capabilities of the soul as already men-
tioned. In this sense, therefore, at least in the case of extended, we already 
have a manner in which we can exclude such entities from the hylomorphic 
unity because, even if we were to agree with the assertion that such enti-
ties participate in the cognitive process, they do not exhibit the other two 
functions of the soul. A crude litmus test would therefore be to say that, in 
cases of distributed cognition, the Aristotelian soul resides in the organic 
body which is animated by unitary life. 10
A crucial clarificatory note should be inserted here. Some philosophers 
use the terms “mental” and “cognitive” interchangeably. However, CC 
do not consider all instances of cognition to be instances of mind (in the 
physicalist, functionalist sense). This can be seen from their line of argu-
mentation, in that they first argue in favour of cognitive processing extend-
ing into the environment, and then ask:
9. Here I refer to “mind” as an entity in itself as opposed to the manner in which Aristotle 
intends it as one of the faculties of soul. 
10. Since the entity (body) that is animated by life is thus capable of performing nutritive 
and perceptive capacities as well. I specify unitary life in order to overcome those instances 
on extended when participants in my cognitive process might be animated by life which is 
not my own (as in the case of cognitive interdependency cases). These cases, generally found 
within physicalist literature, argue that one’s mind extends in such a manner that the minds 
of others also form part of it. For more, see Wilson and Lenart (2015).
139Distributed Cognition
but what of mind? Everything we have said so far is compatible with the 
view that truly mental states—experiences, beliefs, desires, emotions, and so 
on—are all determined by states of the brain. Perhaps what is truly mental 
is internal, after all? We propose to take things a step further. (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998, 12)
This “step further,” as CC put it, this distinction between what is “mental” 
and what is “cognitive,” is of utmost importance and, I hold, the key to 
attempting to articulate this fourth way within an Aristotelian framework. 11 
As has already been mentioned above, a traditional reading of Aristotle 
views the soul (in the case of humans) as having three main capabili-
ties: nutrition, perception, and mind (or “thinking”). It seems, at first, that 
the philosopher cannot both hold that cognition extends outwards of the 
organic body, as in the cases of inorganic and extended, and assert that 
these inorganic, external entities do not relate with the soul (and, con-
sequently, need not be given the corresponding ethical value). Yet, this 
separation of “mental” and “cognitive” would allow the hylomorphist to 
have her cake and eat it!
Here, we may again appeal to the physicalist literature for clarity. 
Clark might be of help in this regard. When discussing the notion of the 
extended, despite arguing in favour of cognitive impartiality, he formulates 
the below definition:
Hypothesis of Organism-Centered Cognition (HOC):
Human cognitive processing (sometimes) literally extends into the environ-
ment surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the organ-
ism, the brain/CNS) remains the core and currently the most active element. 
Cognition is organism centered even when it is not organism bound. (Clark 
2008, 139) 
Therefore, despite asserting cognitive impartiality amongst all the entities 
involved—organic or not—all cognition centres around the organism. This 
is also a plausible way in which Clark can further assert that, lacking Otto’s 
organism, Otto’s notebook is not participating in (Otto’s) cognitive process.
11. CC’s separation of cognition and mind should not be confused with Baker’s attempt 
which has been dismissed above. Baker’s separation, as I have argued, is ad hoc and crafted in 
a manner to “fit” her constitution view without a proper foundation. CC, on the other hand, 
elucidate the same separation as a way of illustrating that the mind does not simply mean 
“the sum of all cognition” but rather involves something more—a whole which exceeds the 
sum of its parts. 
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Transposing this concept onto our present debate, we can say that, wher-
ever human cognition is present, the soul (and, consequently, also ethical 
value) extends up to and only to the space that is animated by the same 
unitary life that animates the organic part of the mind. Taking Otto as our 
example again, we can still call the cognitive processes that take place in 
the other, inorganic entities as properly Otto’s precisely because of HOC—it 
is Otto’s cognition because it is centred around Otto’s organic body—which 
is, in turn, animated by his soul.
Yet, we have not fully bridged the gap between the living, organic body 
and the external, inorganic entities that participate in the cognitive process. 
How can we speak of these different entities as truly being cognitive, while 
the soul remaining the locus of what is mental? The external entities are 
truly cognitive only insofar as the organism around which this cognition 
is centred is animated by a soul having the capacity for mind. 12 This divi-
sion between “cognitive” and “mental” could be another complimentary 
interpretation of the controversial divide Aristotle makes between the “pas-
sive” and “active” mind in De Anima III.5. While many interpretations exist 
on this particular issue within Aristotelian commentary, the fact remains 
that Aristotle articulates the soul’s capacity of mind in two ways, only 
one of which seems to be able to exist outside of the body. Some Christian 
philosophers have taken this to imply an immortal soul (Wilkes 1995, 126), 
yet this is beyond our present concern. The soul’s capacity of having a part 
of the mind that must remain embodied, and another that need not be so, 
might be conceived of as the Aristotelian equivalent of HOC articulated 
above. Thus, Aristotle’s active mind affords us the possibility to maintain 
at the same time the hylomorphic unity and importance of the soul-body, 
while also reconciling the notion of distributed cognition as articulated in 
extended.
In this light, more work still needs to be done. My proposal is only that 
recent advances within neuroscience can be integrated within non-phys-
icalist theories by making use of an Aristotelian framework. This is not 
to say that they should be. Even if the cases of inorganic and extended 
as articulated here were within the realm of science-fiction a few decades 
12. Another way in which we can conceptualise this difference in a simpler fashion is to 
investigate whether the inorganic or external entity is functioning as a tool or as a part of 
the overall cognitive system. While many objects can be said to serve as tools in facilitating 
the cognitive system, this does not entail that they are also parts of that system. In order for 
us to classify a certain entity (inorganic, external, or otherwise), that entity must not merely 
facilitate cognitive functioning, but participate in the overarching teleological functioning 
of the system. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for articulating this difference.
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ago, the future still holds possibilities that we have yet to imagine and 
conceive of. The realities of neuroprostheses and distributed cognition will 
seem insignificant when compared to greater transhumanist issues that are 
slowly coming to the fore, issues which will again need great examination 
and reflection. The role of the philosopher, as always, remains the same. 
From Aristotle down to today, we must continually strive not necessarily 
to change our ontological definitions, but to clarify them in order better 
to explain the phenomena we experience. 
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